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of the State of Utah 
JERRY SINE and DORA A. SINE, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
:JIILDRED IONA HARPER, Ad-
ministratrix of the estate of Cath-




REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this brief is not to argue further 
the points covere·d in arguments I through V in ap:pel-
.lant's brief', but ratper to answer respondents' argu-
ments advanced in support of their three cross-assign-
ments of error. These cross-assignments have reference 
to the admission in evidence by the court of conversa-
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tions with the deceased Cathrine Jensen, both "shortly" 
after and "long" after the sale to the respondents, and 
to t;he, court's refusal to strike some of S'aid conversa-
tions. Appellant's answer to said cross-assignments is 
herein propounded under one proposition as follows: 
. THE UNSWORN DECLARATIONS OF THE 
DECEASED CATHRINE JENSEN, BOTH "SHORT-
LY" AFTER AND "LONG'' AFTER THE TIME O·F 
S.ALE WERE ADMISSIBLE AS EJTHER DIRECT 
OR CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF AN INDE-
PENDENTLY RELATIVE FACT, TO-WIT, HER 
INTENT OR STATE OF MIND, AN EX·CEP'TION 
TO THE HEAR.SAY RULE. 
Plaintiffs alleged in paragraph 7 of· their complaint, 
as amended at the trial; the following (R. 2) : 
7. That plaintiffs have information which 
· they believe and therefore . allege as a fact that 
- -defendant [referring to Cathrine Jensen] in sign-
ing Exhibits ''A'' and '' B '' did so in the belief 
and with the understanding that she was selling 
to p~laintiffs the property described in Paragraph 
3 hereof and that she later discovered the mistake 
that had been made, which discovery was made 
on or about November 24, 1947. 
In answer thereto defendant denied the allegation and 
alleged affirmatively as ~ollow~ (R. 11): 
4. That never at any time did defendant 
[referring to Cathrine Jensen] sell, contract to 
sell, either orally or by writing, or intend to sell 
Parcel 2 to plaintiffs. 
which allegation- was denied in plaintiffs' reply. 
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These pleadings plainly raise as an issue Cathrine 
Jensen's intent or state of mind at the time she nego-
tiated 'vith the plaintiffs' agent and entered into the 
earnest n1oney agreement and also at the time she signed 
the uniform real ·estate contract. Under the exception 
to the hearsay rule that uns,vorn declarations concern-
ing independently relative and probative facts are ad-
missible, the conversations had by defendant and de-
fendant's 'vitnesses with the deceased Cathrine Jensen 
were properly admitted. 
The statements made by Cathrine Jensen to the 
effect that she wanted Mr. Biddinger, her former hus-
band, to build a small two-room house to live in or a 
little lunchstand on the 25¥2 foot piece, that S'he thought 
he was a good cook; that his daughter could help hin1 
and that it was plenty large for a little five-cent place 
and that it would be nice since there were tourist cabins 
around, as testified to by the defendant, Mrs. Harper 
(R. 152-153), her sister, Mrs. Freeman (R. 172), Mr. 
Biddinger ( R. 179-180) and }\ifr. J. C. Jensen· ( R. 185), 
were all offered and admitted not for the pur-
pose of proving the truth of the statements, that is, 
that the 25¥2 foot tract is large enough for a two room 
house or lunchstand, or that Mrs. Freeman was a good 
cook, etc., but rather for the purpose of establishing the. 
fact that Mrs. Cathrine Jensen's state of mind or intent 
at the time she made those statements was that she 
presently owned and had not sold the 25¥2 foot tract, 
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which in turn is competent circumstantial evidence of 
the fact that at the time of entering into the agreement 
in controversy she had no intent to include the 25~2 
foot tract in the sale. The testimony of Verda Wheeler 
at T. 165 and T~. 1'66 concerning the declarations o~ her 
mother, Cathrin~ Jensen, the day of the sale, likewise 
was not offered for the purpose of proving that the 
Sines were not buying all of the property, that Cathrine 
Jensen didn't buy the 25lf2 foot piece with the rest of 
the place ·and that that w·as her reason for not selling it 
with the place, or that she wanted to put a hamburger 
stand some place on it, etc., but rather for the purpose 
of directly establishing Cathrine Jensen's intent and 
state of ·mind with reference to what was included in 
the sale at the time of the transaction. 
Corpus Juris Secundum carries the following dis-
cussion of this exception to the hearsay rule in Volume 
31, page 1007, as follows: 
''Sec. 256- Intent and Intention. Declara-
tions may be relevant evidence as to the existence 
o~ a particular intent or intention in the mind of 
the declarant. Such declarations are admissible 
if, and not unless, the existence of the particular 
m·ental state ·at the time to which the declarations 
relate is a relevant fact; and are to be excluded 
where the intent does not affect the legal result 
of the transaction. The declarations are not direct 
evidence of the facts asserted, but merely circum-
stantial evidence as to the existence of some 
relevant and material fact. Such evidence is ad-
missible,· not as a part of the res gestae, but as 
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a fact relevant to a fact in issue, although, as 
hereinafter pointed out in Section 403, a state-
nlent forming' a part of the res gestae may also 
be admissible to disclose intent or intention." 
and continuing at page 1009 of 31 C. J. S.: 
''Time of declaration.. A declaration of, in-
tent or intention is not necessarily admissible· 
because made contemporaneously with relevant 
acts; existence of the particular mental state at 
that time ~ust itself be a relevant fact. On the 
. othe~ hand, no requirement exists that the mak-
ing of a declaration indicating intent or intention 
should be contemporaneous with th·e time ·when· 
its existence is relevant,_ but th,e test is logic 
rather than time, and, within limits prescribed by 
the rules as to remoteness, prior or subsequent, 
as well ~s accompanying, statements are compe-
tent .. 
''Death of declarant. An otherwise, relevant 
declaration is not rendered incompetent by reason · 
of the fact that the declarant is dead. It has also 
·been declared that such a declaration, to be ad-
missible, must appear to have been made in a 
natural manner, and not under circumstances of 
suspicion. 
''Declarations favorable to declarant. If a 
declaration of intent or intention is relevant, the 
declarant is entitled to the benefit of it, even 
though it be in his favor.'' 
These principles are supported by many other text 
writers, such as Jones, Commentaries on Evidence,. Sec-
tion 1088 ; Wigmore, 3rd Edition, Vol. 4, Section 1729 ; 
I 
Chamberlayne, The Modern Law of Evidence, Vol 4, 
' page 3~619 et seq.; and 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 
162c and d. 
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As examples o~ this doctrine there have been a few 
Utah cases concerning the question of intent of an 
alleged donor at the time of delivery. In the case of 
Mow~r v. Mower (1924) 64 Utah 260, 228 Pac. 911, the 
trial court excluded evidence of extrajudicial declara-
tions of a decedent to the effect that he had made deeds 
and ·put them in his box so that his wives could get them 
upon his death, etc., upon the ground the declarations 
were self-serving and hearsay. This court holding that 
the declarations were admissible inasmuch as they had 
a bearing on the question of intent to deliver the deeds, 
quoted part of the above quotation from Corpus Juris, 
:and said further: 
''In line with the abov<e quotations and· au-
thorities, we remark that in this case the prof-
fered testimony was not offered to. prove the 
truth of the declarations that his wife upon his. 
death could go and get the deeds, or that it was 
the best way to keep his house in order, or that 
he had deeded a part of his land away and it 
would be necessary for him to change his deeds 
to make it ~equal, or the truth of the statements 
· made in his application to the Forest D·epart-
ment, but was offered as additional circumstances, 
along with all the other acts and conduct and sur-
rounding circumstances, to determine whether or 
not there was a delivery of the ·deeds in question. 
We conclude that the offered evidence should 
have been received and that its rejection was 
error." 
This case has been cited as ,.good law and followed in 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 Pac. 2d 465 (1939), 
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Schultz v. Y·oung, 37 N.~l. 4~7, 24 Pac. 2d 276; and Cren- · 
sha'v v. Crensha,v, (1948) 68 Ida. 470, 199 Pac. 2d 264. 
Shnilar declarations as evidence concerning the ques-
tion of delivery 'vere held :admissible in Troseth v. Tro-
seth (1947) 224 Minn. 35, 28 N. W. 2d 65. 
This principle is also applied in cases of fraud, to 
show both bad faith of the defendant and scienter of the 
plaintiff. See Bigelow on Fraud, Vol. 1, Ch·apter X, 
_Section 7. Unsworn declarations of a victim prior to a 
homicide to the effect that he was going over to the 
defendant's house were held ·admissible in State v. Mor-
tensen ( 1903), 26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562 as proof of his 
intention or design, as circumstantial evidence that he 
was there at the time of the killing. In Parry v. Harris 
(1937), 93 Utah 317, 72 Pac. 2d 1044, the court was con-
cerned with the issue of damages in a breach of promisd 
suit, and held that evidence of plaintiffs unsworn dec-
larations to third p~ersons to the effect that she was em-
barrassed to go out among people bec~use they would 
talk about her ·as "the girl who was supposed to marry 
Harry Bransford'' was admissible as proof of her mor-
tification, ·although not admissible for the purpose of 
proving the truth of the statements. And in Wetmore v. 
Mell, 1 Ohio St. Rep. 26, in a suit for breach of promise, 
plaintiffs unsworn statement to her sister as well as her 
conduct in preparing her trousseau were held 'admissible 
for the purp~ose of proving her acceptance of the offer 
of marriage. The court in Burrell Engineering and Con-
struction Co. v. Grisier (1922), 111 Tex. 447, 240 S. ·vv. 
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899, held that :a statement by ·an employee to the defend-
ant's superintendent that machinery was defective, was 
admissible, not to show the truth of the fact that the 
machine was defective, but to show that the superinten-
dent was put on notice of the likelihood of a defect, and 
therefore . negligent in not having it repaired. 
The above examples, particularly the Utah cases 
dealing with the question of intention to deliver, serve 
to show the applicability of the above exception to the 
hearsay rule in instances. such as the principal case 
where the intention or state of mind of a person at a 
·particular time is a material issue to be dete!mined. It 
is therefore submitted that the evidence of Cathrine 
Jensen's statements in the conversations with her daugh-
ters, Mr. Biddinger and Mr. Jensen, had at a time before 
any claim of mutual mistake was made, were properly 
admitted :as showing her state of mind or knowledge of 
what ~she included in _the sale at the time of the trans-
action with Mr. Dowell. The appellant respectfully 
urges this court to consider this evidence, as it may do 
in equity actions, together with all of the other compe_. 
tent ·evidence, records and files in this case, to reverse . 
the. lower court and to direct that judgment denying 
reformation be entered in favor of the defendant, and 
for whatever other relief to the court seems equitable. 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
ROBERT S. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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